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Applied Strategic Art

Integrated Campaigning in
the Pacific, 1918–1948
Earl J. Catagnus Jr. and Jonathan P. Klug
ABSTRACT: Russia, China, and other nations operate in a perpetual
state of competition with the United States. Recognizing this reality,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently published the Joint Concept for
Integrated Campaigning and Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition
Continuum. This article places these documents within the historical
context of World War II in the Pacific and argues they are a return to a
traditional American approach to the employment of military force.

T

he Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning ( JCIC) and the Joint
Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19, Competition Continuum, are a return to
a more traditional American strategic approach where, in times of
peace, military power was applied mostly to advance economic interests.1
Often, promoting US economic interests required the application of
military force within the so-called gray zone between war and peace, a
place in which American military leaders were quite adept at operating.
The Pacific region from 1918–48 provides an excellent example of this
strategic environment. Military force was applied along the competition
continuum within integrated campaigns. All stages of the continuum—
cooperation, competition below the level of armed conflict, and armed
conflict—were present, sometimes occurring simultaneously. The region
was hotly contested and never fully at peace, requiring leaders to employ
all elements of national power to secure American interests. Playing out
across vast distances, this great-power rivalry ranged from the relatively
benign to the waging of a total war and featured both the first-ever
international arms reduction action and the only uses of atomic weapons.
A wide range of national security challenges face the United
States—confronting near-peer adversaries, containing rogue states, and
defeating nonstate, transnational terrorist and criminal organizations,
posing a significant dilemma for American national security leaders.2
The JCIC called for Joint Force commanders and their staffs to think,
plan, and execute integrated campaigns where the Joint Force works in
concert with the interagency, partners, and allies rather than as an
independent entity only employed in direct military conflict. Building on
previous assessments of the current and future operating environments,
JDN 1-19 began the process to codify Competition Continuum, a construct

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Operating Environment, 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and
Disordered World (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016); and JCS, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note
(JDN) 1-19 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019).
2. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017), 8–13, 45–54.
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embracing the spectrum of challenges within an era of enduring global
competition.
Compared to other agencies and organizations, the sheer size
of the Department of Defense has the potential to make it the lead
agency for most national security endeavors. Unilateral leadership,
however, is not the objective of integrated campaigns. Although Joint
Force capabilities are unparalleled in size and scope, the JCIC calls for
Joint Force commanders to “identify physical and cognitive campaign
objectives and then align resources and actions—across the range of
partners—to ensure the accomplishment of these objectives.”3 They
are not to exercise command or attempt to control those outside their
legal jurisdictions. Instead, while campaigning through the competition
continuum to secure national interests—not all military in nature—
Joint Force commanders are to collaborate with civilian agencies, allies,
and partners to create unity of effort.

Prior to Pearl Harbor

The historical antecedents for integrated campaigning are much
older than the relatively recent Cold War period. Prior to World War
II, gray zone conflict was a natural part of the operating environment,
ambiguous strategic guidance and shifting policies were the norm,
interagency collaboration was expected, officers routinely performed
diplomatic functions to include negotiating treaties, and it was
understood that economic progress was usually the underlying motive
behind most foreign policy.
Securing the industrial base, particularly its labor force, technological
innovations, and manufacturing capacity, was essential for maintaining
American hegemony. At its core, this approach was conceptually
Hamiltonian and reflective of Edward Meade Earle’s influential essay,
“Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic
Foundations of Military Power.”4 Hamilton viewed military power as
both a byproduct and an adjunct to economic power. The pursuit of
military power was not an end unto itself, but rather a means to an
economic end resulting in national independence and individual freedom.
Although Hamilton’s system was not adopted wholesale, the assumption
that military capacity was drawn from and supported the economic
needs of the people has become part of the collective American mind.
This was assumption especially true when military force was applied
outside the confines of war in periods of contested peace.5

3. JCS, Joint Operating Environment, 11.
4. Edward Meade Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic
Foundations of Military Power,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to
Hitler, ed. Earle, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 3rd ed. (1943; repr. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1948), 117–54.
5. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York:
MacMillan Publishing, 1980).
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Throughout the middle to late 1800s, Americans sought new trading
partners and relatively untouched markets.6 Since European empires like
Britain, France, and Spain dominated trade in Africa and Central and
South America, only Asia was open for economic expansion. Diplomats
secured trade treaties across the Pacific and established consuls in
many fledgling island nations. By the 1870s, the United States had
a foothold in the Chinese market and had opened trade with Japan.
The Spanish-American War made the United States a global power
with colonial possessions of Guam and the Philippines to administer
and defend.
Adding these new territories to other Pacific territories such as
Hawaii and Wake Island provided the bases that naval officer and
historian Alfred Thayer Mahan so adamantly argued the US Navy
required to project power. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt
declared the “Mediterranean era died with the discovery of America,”
and “the Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn.” 7
Shortly afterward, the Russo-Japanese War broke out. It ended with
Japan’s stunning victory, which established it as a regional power and
set the conditions for a future war.
Following the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 in China, the US Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps maintained garrisons and ships at strategic locations
along critical waterways, rail lines, and internationally controlled
sections of cities. Their tactical mission was to protect American lives
and property, but their strategic objective was to maintain the Open
Door policy in China and enhance American influence throughout the
region. American commanders worked closely with and sometimes
under the direct control of State Department officials.
American naval officers became naturally at ease operating within
this complex environment. In a 1922 Naval War College lecture, Rear
Admiral H. S. Sharp explained, “the life experience of a naval officer is
a broadening one,” specifically in the “practical matter of international
affairs and foreign people” where their duties, and, more importantly,
individual professional responsibility, often called upon them to act as
diplomats, negotiators, law and treaty enforcers, and peacekeepers.8
During the interwar years as their commitments abroad expanded,
Army officers demonstrated equal competence in such affairs. Both
naval and military officers coordinated with Christian missionary
organizations to ensure the safety and, at times, the safe evacuation
of far-flung missions. Freedom of navigation patrols, field maneuvers,
and even the routines of military courtesy and protocol were used to

6. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since
1776 (New York: Mariner Books, 1997), 50–51, 96–97, 106–9.
7. Quoted in John Costello, The Pacific War, 1941–1945 (New York: Quill, 1982), 3.
8. H. S. Sharp, “Naval Officer in Diplomacy” (lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI, July 25,
1922), 2–3, Naval War College Digital Archives, https://www.usnwcarchives.org/.
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demonstrate power and exert influence over an array of international
navies and militaries.9

World War II

For the United States, the interwar years ended abruptly with
the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, which shocked and incensed
the American people. The next day, President Roosevelt made his
iconic “Day of Infamy” speech, to which Congress responded by
declaring war on Imperial Japan.10 The next four years consisted of
bloody warfare, but there was much more to American activities in
the Pacific than just armed conflict. From a national perspective, the
United States used the military instrument of national power exercised
through integrated campaigning in conjunction with diplomatic,
informational, and economic instruments of national power aimed at
both punishing Imperial Japan and achieving a better peace. From
a military perspective, fighting the Pacific War required cooperation
amongst the services and with Allies, armed conflict with Imperial
Japan, and even competition with Allies.11
Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 includes specific definitions of three forms
of cooperation: engage selectively, maintain, and advance.12 World
War II was global in nature and so was US cooperation with its Allies
Great Britain and the Soviet Union. When the Germans touched off
World War II with the invasion of Poland, a neutral United States sought
to engage selectively with Great Britain through loans. The relationship
was transactional in nature, as American legislation required other
nations to purchase US war goods, and the United States still sought
competitive advantage over the United Kingdom. Thus, the United
States sought to help Britain against Nazi aggression while improving
its own strategic position.
As the fortunes of Europe and the United Kingdom waned,
however, the United States sought to maintain Great Britain as a bulwark
against the Axis powers, creating the lend-lease program and then
system, which increasingly helped Britain while reducing competition
with Britain.13 After Pearl Harbor, American cooperation with its
erstwhile competitors now potential Allies increased dramatically,
and the United States advanced its relationship, becoming allied with
9. See General Charles L. Bolte interview by Maclyn Burg (oral historian), October 17, 1973,
transcript, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 16–23; and Costello, Pacific War, 3–54.
10. Costello, Pacific War, 149–50; and Ronald H. Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War
with Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 6–7.
11. JCS, Competition Continuum, v–vii; Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won:
Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000);
Costello, Pacific War; and Spector, Eagle against the Sun.
12. JCS, Competition Continuum, 6.
13. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Konecky & Konecky,
1956), 399–400, 457–59; Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (1940–1945) (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 24–25; Murray and Millett, War to Be Won, 136, 164–68, 243, 251, 269; and
I. C. B. Dear, ed., The Oxford Companion to World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995),
787, 790, 677–83.
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Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Nationalist China, and the
Soviet Union.14
The Allies’ war with Japan was total in nature, and JDN 1-19 defines
four activities conducted in armed conflict useful to help understand
this war: defeat, deny, degrade, and disrupt.15 After Pearl Harbor, the United
States made several efforts to deny the Japanese from achieving their
strategic objectives. First, American and Philippine forces defended the
Philippine Islands as long as they could, denying the Japanese a quick
victory and the ability to use those forces elsewhere. Similarly, the United
States and other Allies used naval forces in an effort to deny the Japanese
a quick victory in the Java Sea, which while it failed, it nonetheless served
to slow the Japanese. Meanwhile, the United States increased its efforts
to support the Nationalist Chinese against Japan, denying the Japanese
victory in China and thereby tying up a large part of the Japanese Army
fighting the Nationalist Chinese and Communist Chinese.16
Almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, the US military also began
efforts to disrupt the Japanese. The Doolittle Raid was one of the first
and most important of these efforts. This small raid had negligible
tactical impact but had strategic-level disruptive effects. The Japanese
military felt dishonored by the attack on the Japanese home islands—a
demonstration of the military’s potential vulnerability. Furthermore,
there was a perception of a threat to the Japanese emperor, however
remote in reality. The Japanese military reacted to the raid with the
attack on the Aleutian Islands and Midway Island, which was ultimately
disastrous. Carrier strikes, Marine Raider Battalion operations, and
some submarine efforts were other examples of operational-level
disruption efforts.17
The United States used three key efforts to degrade Imperial Japan’s
ability and will to wage war. The first two—a submarine campaign that
quietly eviscerated the Japanese merchant marine and an extensive
mining effort, which reached a crescendo in 1945 with the introduction
of B-29 Superfortress bombers—resulted in shortages of raw materials
that led to cascading effects upon Japanese industry and military
operations. Additionally, the mining effort limited and degraded both
operations and training programs, especially for aircraft pilots. The
third effort, a strategic bombing campaign, devastated the Japanese
ability to wage war in terms of war industry, infrastructure, and military
capabilities. But the will of the Japanese remained strong enough to fight
on until the deployment by the United States of two atomic bombs and
the Soviet entry in the Pacific War.18
14. Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 165, 197–99, 228, 232, 292, 388, 450, 472, 485, 488, 532,
534–36, 561; and Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 324–27.
15. JCS, Competition Continuum, 5.
16. Costello, Pacific War, 99–108, 171–72, 206–10, 236–44; Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 55–59,
133–34, 143–47, 466–68, 545–46; and Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 181–88, 220–22.
17. Costello, Pacific War, 219, 448–53; Murray and Millett, War to Be Won, 190–91, 347, 365; and
Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 154–55, 271–72.
18. Costello, Pacific War, 233–36, 245, 453–55; Murray and Millett, War to Be Won, 223–27,
503–7, 516–25; and Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 478–94, 503–6, 525–30, 554–58.
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The Allies had three theaters of war in which to defeat Imperial
Japan. In a sense, the oldest was the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI)
where Imperial Japan fought for years before Pearl Harbor. The Allied
command structure in this theater was complicated on paper and even
more so in reality—Chiang Kai-shek was in command in China and
American General Joseph W. Stillwell served as his deputy. The British
also had major subordinate commanders, most notably Admiral Louis
Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten, the nominal CBI theater commander.
The two newer theaters were the Southwest Pacific Area, under the
command of US Army General Douglas MacArthur and the Pacific
Ocean Areas under the command of US Navy Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
The two American theater commanders worked to defeat Imperial
Japan by forcing its unconditional surrender and changing its militaristic
nature while CBI remained a supporting theater.19 In 1942, MacArthur’s
forces stemmed the Japanese tide on New Guinea and then went on the
offensive, which picked up speed and momentum as he fought to retake
the Philippines in 1944 and 1945. Meanwhile, Nimitz’s forces took and
held Guadalcanal and later began the Central Pacific drive in 1943 that
would, like MacArthur’s forces, increase the pace of its offensive in
1944 and 1945.
Just as US cooperation with its Allies changed over the course of
the war, so did US competition with its Allies. The JDN 1-19 includes
specific definitions of three activities in competition below armed
conflict: enhance, manage, and delay. For example, America enhanced its
position at Britain’s expense as Great Britain took wartime loans and gave
up influence and bases in the Western Hemisphere.20 In the immediate
aftermath of the Japanese 1941 attacks, the Allies fought desperately
to stem the Japanese onslaught, which involved all Allies stepping up
their cooperation.
Despite this need for short-term cooperation to defeat the common
foe of Imperial Japan, some competition remained, and the United States
changed its competitive activities to focus on managing Great Britain.
As the Pacific War continued and the prospects of victory increased,
America and her Allies increased their competition for postwar political
and strategic advantage, especially as the war neared its conclusion.
Given the growing signs of war weariness in the American people, the
United States attempted to delay the Soviet Union over eastern Europe
and China.21

Beyond World War II

The unexpected speed of the Japanese surrender after the atomic
bombs were dropped in August 1945 caused immediate and massive
19. Costello, Pacific War, 225–26, 255–56, 388–89, 579–86, 607; Spector, Eagle against the Sun,
144–47 545–46; and Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 151, 157–64, 191, 197–98, 218, 227–32, 338,
349, 485, 509, 521.
20. Dear, Oxford Companion, 297–98, 787, 790, 677–83.
21. Costello, Pacific War, 536–38; Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 521–22; and Spector, Eagle
against the Sun, 324–79.
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redeployments of troops to occupation duties throughout Asia.
Overnight, senior leaders made a conscious, deliberate, yet ultimately
swift strategic shift from fighting an unlimited global war to competing
against the ideology of communism and the state and nonstate actors
who embraced it. Although unsuccessful for many reasons, Operation
Beleaguer, the occupation of North China until 1947, combined force
deployments and Nationalist Chinese training programs in support of
diplomatic efforts to stem the onslaught of Chinese communism.
The 40 years of Japanese occupation left Korea in a vacuum, and
the US Army filled this void. The Korean Military Advisory Group
was hugely successful in South Korea, building partner capacity and
creating space for Syngman Rhee’s government to wage an effective
counterinsurgency campaign. The famed historian Allan R. Millett, an
expert on the Korean War, went so far as proclaiming this success was
what led to Kim Il-Sung’s decision to invade the south in June 1950.22

Conclusion

American cooperation, competition, and conflict in the twentieth
century in the Pacific demonstrate the JCIC and JDN 1-19 have deep
historical roots. Traditionally, the underlying reason America exercised
its military strength short of war was to bolster the other elements of
national power, chiefly economic power. Military force was adjunct
and even subordinated to diplomatic and economic action. Naval and
military commanders inherently understood this and waged integrated
campaigns to secure national interests in concert with other government
agencies, Allies, and partners.
Before 1941, naval and military commanders simultaneously executed
campaigns of cooperation and competition throughout the contested
Pacific region. They did this all while working for, with, and through
various agencies like the State Department as well as communicating
and coordinating with private entities such as news reporters and
Christian missionaries. During World War II, they created campaign
plans that were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval, integrated
into a global strategy, and executed across three different theaters of
operations. After the war, these same commanders confronted great
power adversaries, administered occupied governments, and competed
throughout the region below the level of armed conflict.
As a result of its growth and prestige as the Cold War progressed,
the US military became overly focused on purely military matters. Senior
military and political leaders perceived effective strategy was the ability
to enhance capabilities to deter war. If war did come, then a successful
strategy was winning enough battles to win that war. When the Soviet
Union fell, this condition only worsened. The current National Security
Strateg y and National Defense Strateg y make this strategic focus anathema.
22. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Center for Military
History (CMH) Pub. 30-3 (Washington, DC: CMH, 1962); and Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea,
1945–1950: A House Burning (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).
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The JCIC and JDN 1-19 provide a blueprint for military leaders to return
to a more traditional American strategic approach to employing military
force in times of peace.
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